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THE AUSTRALIAN INDIGENOUS BUSINESS 
EXEMPTION AS A ‘SPECIAL MEASURE’: 
QUESTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 
MATTHEW STOREY* 
This article considers the issue of the requirements of establishing the Australian 
Commonwealth government’s Indigenous preferential procurement program, the 
‘indigenous business exemption’ as a special measure under Article 1.4 of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
It does this by, considering jurisprudence regarding special measures and other 
affirmative action programs from Australia and other jurisdictions, concluding that 
it is necessary to establish some evidential base to justify the establishment (in 
Australian law) and ongoing operation of such measures (in international law). The 
article then examines the effectiveness of procurement policies aimed at achieving 
secondary social objectives in addition to the primary procurement of government 
goods and services.  
I INTRODUCTION 
This discussion examines the issue of the extent to which it is necessary to be able to 
demonstrate a factual basis in order to legitimise the establishment and maintenance 
of a program as a special measure under both the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
(Cth) (‘RDA’) and the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination1 (‘the Convention’). The context of this examination is a 
program under which enterprises owned by Indigenous Australians receive 
preferential consideration in the award of Australian Commonwealth Government 
procurement contracts. 
                                                
* Chief Executive Officer, Native Title Services Victoria; University Fellow, Charles 
Darwin University School of Law; DBA Candidate, Deakin University Faculty of Law and 
Business. The author thanks Professor Stuart Orr and the anonymous referee for their useful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
1 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 
1969).   
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The Commonwealth Procurement Rules 2014 (‘CPR’)2 issued by the Minister for 
Finance under section 105B(1) of the Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) at Division 1 demand that all procurements by a 
Commonwealth department or agency demonstrate value for money and adhere to 
the key principles of public procurement such as non-discrimination, the 
encouragement of competition, and ethicality. Division 2 of the CPR also insists that 
the procurement of goods and services of a value of greater than $80,000 or the 
commissioning of construction projects of a value greater than $7.5 million be by 
way of public tender. However, the CPR also contains provisions that exempt an 
agency from the Division 2 requirement for public tender if the contract is awarded 
to a firm with greater than 50 per cent Indigenous ownership that employs fewer than 
200 employees and where ‘value for money’ can be demonstrated.3 This exemption 
from the usual Commonwealth procurement tender requirements, which was 
included in the CPR from 2011, is known as the ‘Indigenous business exemption’ 
(‘IBE’). 
In July 2015 the Commonwealth government expanded upon the IBE when it 
announced its ‘Indigenous Procurement Policy’ (‘IPP’). The IPP builds upon the IBE 
by requiring that a percentage of all Commonwealth procurement contracts (0.5 per 
cent in 2015–16 increasing to 2.5 per cent by 2018–19) are awarded to Indigenous-
owned firms, and by introducing a mandatory requirement that procurement contracts 
of a value between $80,000 and $200,000 for provision of goods and services in 
remote areas must be awarded to Indigenous-owned firms. In essence the IPP adds a 
policy overlay onto the IBE but leaves the original IBE in place. 
Quite clearly the original IBE and the new IPP facilitates, and in some circumstances 
demands, discrimination on the basis of race. On its face then, the IBE would appear 
to offend section 9(1) of the RDA which contains the fundamental prohibition against 
doing an act involving a ‘distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on 
race’. The RDA gives domestic effect in Australia to the Convention. 
The risk of unlawfulness under section 9(1) of the RDA can only be met with a 
response that the IBE is exempt from the application of section 9(1) on the basis that 
(pursuant to section 8(1) of the RDA) the IBE constitutes a ‘special measure’ for the 
purposes of Article 1.4 of the Convention, which provides (emphasis added):  
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of 
certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be 
necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise 
                                                
2 Department of Finance, Commonwealth Procurement Rules 2014, Statutory Instrument 
(2014) <http://www. 
finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/2014%20Commonwealth%20Procurement%20Rules.pdf>.  
3 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Commonwealth Indigenous Procurement 
Policy (2015) <http://www.dpmc.gov.au/indigenous-affairs/publication/factsheet-using-
commonwealth-procurement-rules-indigenous-exemption-no17-meet-indigenous-
procurement-policy>. 
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of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial 
discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, 
lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they 
shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been 
achieved. 	
The main goal of this current discussion is to investigate the extent to which it is 
necessary for the Commonwealth government to be able to demonstrate that the IBE 
is a legitimate response ‘necessary in order to ensure [Indigenous Australians’] equal 
enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ and to be able to 
demonstrate that the IBE is effective in this goal. 
To achieve this goal, the discussion will proceed in three parts. The first part considers 
Australian and international jurisprudence surrounding the concept of ‘special 
measures’ within the Convention. This examination will involve consideration of not 
only Article 1.4 but also Article 2.2. Some regard to the jurisprudence from the United 
States (‘US’) with regard to ‘minority’ procurement set asides as considered in 
Adarand Constructors Inc v Pena4 is included in this consideration, as is very briefly 
some jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’). The purpose of this 
comparative analysis is to highlight the different approaches taken to the factual basis 
considered necessary to support characterisation of an apparently racially 
discriminatory policy as a special measure. 
This examination will suggest that it is necessary for the Commonwealth to be able 
to identify that Indigenous Australians do not currently have equal enjoyment or 
exercise of human rights and freedoms in order to characterise a program as a special 
measure. Further, that under domestic law it is also necessary to show that the IBE is 
‘appropriate and adapted’5 to redressing this situation. The discussion continues on 
to suggest that at international law it is also necessary to demonstrate that a program 
is effective in remedying the original unequal enjoyment or exercise of human rights 
and freedoms. This approach it is suggested is similar to the evidential approach 
required under US affirmative action jurisprudence. This part of the discussion 
concludes by noting that in order to be able to demonstrate the effectiveness of a 
program it is necessary to have in place mechanisms to undertake the monitoring and 
evaluation of the program. 
The next two parts of the discussion focus upon some of the evidential issues 
identified as necessary above. Part two examines the position of Australia’s 
Indigenous peoples with a view to first establish the need for implementation of a 
special measure; and, second, to review literature that considers whether the fostering 
of Indigenous enterprise as contemplated by the IBE can be expected to remedy the 
unequal enjoyment of ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’. This examination 
is aimed at exploring whether the IBE can be considered as ‘appropriate and adapted’ 
                                                
4 115 US 2097 (1995) (‘Adarand’). 
5 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 149 (Deane J) (‘Gerhardy’). 
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as a special measure in accordance with domestic jurisprudence. The final part 
considers the issue of whether the IBE can be expected to be successful in fostering 
Indigenous enterprise. To this end, this part identifies the use made of the IBE to date 
and reviews existing literature regarding the effectiveness of procurement policies 
such as the IBE designed to achieve ‘secondary objectives’ in addition to the primary 
objective of obtaining goods and services on behalf of government more generally. 
The discussion then moves to consider the need for and approaches to the monitoring 
and evaluation of programs such as the IBE in light of the concluding discussion in 
part two that identified such mechanisms as an ongoing requirement of a special 
measure.  
The article concludes by emphasising need for the ongoing effectiveness of the IBE 
to be monitored over time. 
II SPECIAL MEASURES 
Within the Convention the concept of special measures is utilised on two occasions. 
The first is in Article 1.4 which has been reproduced above. The second is in Article 
2.2 the terms of which are also worth noting: 
States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social, 
economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure the 
adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals 
belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no 
case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for 
different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have been 
achieved. 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’) established 
under the Convention in its General Recommendation 326  notes that: ‘[Article 2.2] 
carries forward the special measures concept [contained in Article 1.4] into the realm 
of obligations of States parties’ (emphasis added).7 
While most Australian judicial consideration of special measures has been focused 
on the Convention, the special measures approach is found in other international 
instruments as well. Prominent amongst these are Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the 
                                                
6 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No 
32: The Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms [of] Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/GC/32 (24 September 
2009).   
7 The fact that art 2.2 creates an obligation on states to implement special measures where 
appropriate is also noted in Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR 70, 96 (Mason J), 138 (Brennan J), 
although Brennan J also noted that this obligation is not enforceable in municipal court. 
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(‘CEDAW’).8 Article 4.1 of CEDAW provides: 
Adoption by States parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de 
facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as 
defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the 
maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued 
when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. 
CEDAW Article 4.1 creates a regime permissive of special measures in the nature of 
the Convention Article 1.4, unlike the obligation created under the Convention 
Article 2.2. While these special measures provisions are quite well known, perhaps 
less obvious is the potential obligation for states to develop special measures that is 
contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’).9 As 
Ginsburg and Merritt argue, while the UDHR may not contain an explicit special 
measures provision in the nature of the Convention Article 2.2, provisions such as 
Article 25 (‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services …’) imply that: 
[i]f a nation finds that citizens of one race — or sex or religion — endure a markedly 
inadequate standard of living, then Article 25 suggests an obligation to uncover the 
cause of, and respond to, that endurance.10 
The same authors suggest a similar obligation arises from a number of other UDHR 
provisions such as Articles 23, 26 and 29. 
Despite a clearly respectable pedigree in international human rights law, as the cases 
considered below indicate, the appropriateness of special measures is often hotly 
contested. One clue as to the basis of this contest may be found in General 
Recommendation 32.11 The CERD notes that special measures under the Convention 
are also referred to as ‘affirmative measures’, ‘affirmative action’ or ‘positive 
action’.12 The CERD goes on to note ‘[t]he term “positive discrimination” is, in the 
context of international human rights standards, a contradicto in terminis and should 
be avoided’.13  
                                                
8 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, opened for signature 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13.  
9 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, opened for signature 10 
December 1948, 217 A(III). 
10 R Ginsburg and D Merritt, ‘Affirmative Action: A Human Rights Dialogue’ (1999) 21 
Cardozo Law Review 253, 257. 
11 CERD, above n 6. 
12 Ibid [12]. 
13 Ibid. 
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It is perhaps this apparent contradiction that has led to ‘special measures’ being such 
a contested method for achieving functional equality in a society. Whatever the basis 
there can be no doubt about the reality of the contest around the legitimacy of ‘special 
measures’. To illustrate this point jurisprudence from both the US and Europe will be 
considered before returning to consider Australian cases. 
A United States 
The jurisprudence regarding special measures in the US arises in the context of cases 
that have considered the constitutionality of affirmative action programs that have 
been impugned as contravening the ‘equal protection clause’ of section 1 of the 14th 
Amendment to the US Constitution.14 As can be imagined, the 14th Amendment, in 
particular the equal protection clause, has been litigated in many significant cases 
starting with Strauder v West Virginia15 (constitutionality of all white juries), and 
including Brown v Board of Education of Topeka16 constitutionality of school 
segregation). In 1973 Roe v Wade17 involved consideration of the 14th Amendment’s 
due process clause. 
Thus an appreciation of the US Supreme Court’s approach to affirmative action 
(special measures) programs involves some appreciation of the Court’s approach to 
government legislation or programs that may, at first blush, appear to infringe 
constitutionally guaranteed rights including, but not limited to, equal protection (for 
example, free speech or privacy matters are also included in this discourse). This 
approach is often categorised as ‘three tiered’.18 Under this approach programs based 
upon ‘suspect’ classifications, such as race, alienage and national origin or that 
involve restrictions of fundamental rights such as the right to speech or vote are 
subject to ‘strict scrutiny’.19 Those based on semi-suspect classifications such as 
gender or illegitimacy will be subject to ‘intermediate scrutiny’. Programs that do not 
burden rights or involve suspect classes are subject only to a ‘rational basis’ test. This 
last test requires the program ‘be rationally related to a legitimate objective’.20 
                                                
14 ‘All persons born or naturalised in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law’ 
(emphasis added). In Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497 (1954), the US Supreme Court held that 
the provisions of the 14th Amendment were applicable also to the federal government. 
15 100 US 303 (1880). 
16 347 US 483 (1954). 
17 410 US 113 (1973). 
18 A Bhagwat, ‘Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis’ (1997) 85(2) California Law 
Review 297. 
19 Ibid 303. See also PJ Rubin, ‘Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive 
Approach to Strict Scrutiny after Adarand and Shaw’ (2000) 149 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1, 13. 
20 Bhagwat, above n 18, 303. 
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Intermediate scrutiny requires that a program be ‘substantially related to the 
achievement of an important government interest’.21 
Strict scrutiny requires that the program be ‘narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling government interest’.22 
The historical origins of the application of the strict scrutiny test to programs 
involving an aspect of racial classification apparently lie in the early 1960s.23 The 
application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs though was at first 
unclear. An early example of consideration of the issue was Defunis v Odegaard.24 
This case involved affirmative action in university entry although that matter was left 
unresolved on technical grounds. 
The suspicion with which affirmative action programs have been viewed in US 
jurisprudence is aptly summed up in University of California v Bakke: ‘Racial and 
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most 
exacting judicial examination.’25 
Despite this, in Steelworkers v Weber,26 the lawfulness of a voluntary employment 
affirmative action program was upheld. However, in City of Richmond v JA Croson 
Co27 the strict scrutiny standard was applied to determine a ‘set-aside’ program of the 
City of Richmond as unlawful. The case was seen as applying to all state and local 
government programs.28 Shortly after Croson though, the intermediate scrutiny 
standard was applied to uphold the validity of a program requiring the set aside of 
particular broadcasting licences to ethnic minority groups in Metro Broadcasting v 
Federal Communications Commission.29 
In Adarand Constructors Inc v Pena,30 the Court was quite definitive in applying 
strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action programs. Specifically, the Supreme Court 
(by a 5:4 majority) found: 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. See also RH Fallon, ‘Strict Judicial Scrutiny’ (2007) 54 UCLA Law Review 1267, 
1273 citing Johnson v California 543 US 499, 505 (2005). 
23 Fallon, above n 22, 1277 suggests McLaughlin v Florida 379 US 184 (1964) but notes 
that Brown and Bolling should also be seen as part of the discourse. 
24 416 US 312 (1974). 
25 University of California v Bakke 438 US 265, 290–1 (1978). 
26 443 US 193 (1979). 
27 480 US 469 (1989). 
28 M Rice and M Mongkuo, ‘Did Adarand Kill Minority Set-Asides?’ (1998) 58(1) Public 
Administration Review 82, 84. See also US Commission on Civil Rights, Federal 
Procurement after Adarand Report (2005) 
<https://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/fedprocafteradarand.pdf>. 
29 497 US 557 (1990). 
30 115 US 2097 (1995). 
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‘Because racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate 
treatment, and because classifications based on race are potentially so harmful to 
the entire body politic, it is especially important that the reasons for any such 
classification be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate,’ and that ‘[r]acial 
classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection 
between justification and classification.’ We think that requiring strict scrutiny is 
the best way to ensure that courts will consistently give racial classifications that 
kind of detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means.31 
The practical result of Adarand is that affirmative action programs in government 
procurement must, or at least should, be based on a ‘disparity analysis’ of the disparity 
between the ‘number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform 
the service and the number of such contractors engaged’.32 This requirement for 
disparity analysis appears to have been adopted as the evidential base required to 
satisfy ‘strict scrutiny’.33 
It is worthwhile to note that the acceptance of an affirmative action program as 
plausibly valid, subject to application of the strict scrutiny analysis, involves 
acceptance of the notion that such a program is one that at least could be ‘narrowly 
tailored to advance a compelling government interest’. This involves acceptance that 
eliminating systemic or indirect discrimination is a matter of compelling government 
interest.34 
The issue was identified by the Court in Adarand where their Honours were at pains 
to point out that the application of strict scrutiny did not mean that affirmative action 
programs were therefore prohibited absolutely: 
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal 
in fact.’ Fullilove, supra, at 519 (Marshall, J, concurring in judgment). The unhappy 
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination 
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is 
not disqualified from acting in response to it.35 
In fact a study of state and local government measures undertaken seven years after 
the Croson decision imposed the strict scrutiny test found little impact on the 
prevalence of the special measures problems; in fact, in many states the disparity 
analysis had led to an increase in special measures programs.36 Similarly a number 
                                                
31 Adarand, 115 US 2097 [236] (1995) (O’Connor J) citing Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 
448, 553–5, 555 (1980).  
32 Rice and Mongkuo, above n 28; see also US Commission on Civil Rights, above n 28.  
33 US Commission on Civil Rights, above n 28, 1. 
34 See Fallon above n 22, 1321. 
35 Adarand, 115 US 2097 [237] (1995) (O’Connor J) citing Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 
448, 519 (1980). 
36 M Enchautegui, M Fix, P Loprest, S von der Lippe, and D Wissoker  Do Minority Owned 
Businesses Get a Fair Share of Government Contracts? Report (Urban Institute, 1997) 49 
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of federal programs (especially those under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act)37 
have continued despite post Adarand challenges.38 This includes the setting of 
government wide goals (5 per cent) for procurement from socially disadvantaged 
businesses. Implementation of these goals is variable across agencies with the overall 
program managed by the Small Business Administration established under the Small 
Business Act.39 
In summary, US constitutional law allows for the operation of affirmative action 
(special measures) programs but through the application of strict scrutiny requires an 
identifiable evidential foundation (in the form of disparity analysis) to justify their 
establishment. Notably, however, while US case law suggests the need for actual 
evidence to support the establishment of a special measures program there is no 
explicit requirement for ongoing monitoring as to whether the program achieves its 
goals and should be discontinued. This noted it would presumably be open to a 
plaintiff to challenge the ongoing operation of an affirmative action program if they 
believed a change of circumstances warranted it. 
B Europe 
The European Union (‘EU’) also has struggled with the legitimacy of the inclusion 
of criteria designed to enhance social equality in public procurement. The basic 
principle is contained in Article 2 of Directive 2004/18/EC (‘the Procurement 
Directive’)40 which provides: 
Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and non‑
discriminatorily and shall act in a transparent way. 
This prohibition of discrimination in the award of contracts sits uncomfortably with 
special measures.41 Attempts to specify social (or environmental) requirements in a 
tender specification are specifically addressed in Article 23 of the Procurement 
Directive: 
                                                
<http://www.urban.org/research /publication/do-minority-owned-businesses-get-fair-share-
government-contracts>. 
3715 USC Ch 14A (Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership program). Under this 
program the Small Business Administration department assumes the role of head contractor 
and allocates subcontracts to minority businesses. 
38 US Commission on Civil Rights, above n 28, 130. 
39 Ibid 143. 
40 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0018&from=EN>. See also Directive 
2004/17/EC regarding Construction Services. 
41 A specific exception is made with regard to ‘sheltered workshops’ in art 19 of the 
Procurement Directive. 
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Which stipulate that technical specifications must not reduce competition, must be 
transparent and must not discriminate against possible contractors from outside the 
Member State of the contracting authority.42 
The tension created from the prohibition on discrimination and the desire to use 
procurement to further social objectives has led to a number of cases before the ECJ. 
Cases from Beentjes43 in 1988 to Max Havelaar44 in 2012 have, however, suggested 
an uncomfortable and limited acceptance of such policies.45 As Muller-Wrede notes, 
in the Max Havelaar case, the ECJ found: 
compliance with the [tender]  ‘criteria of sustainability of purchases and socially 
responsible business’ and the obligation to ‘contribute to improving the 
sustainability of the coffee market and to environmentally, socially and 
economically responsible coffee production’ are not sufficiently clear, precise and 
unequivocal and therefore infringe the transparency obligation stipulated in Article 
2 of the Directive.46 
The result is that the ECJ has imposed strict controls around the use of such policies 
— demanding a strict ‘subject matter of the contract nexus’ with the social policy in 
question47 in a manner not dissimilar to the US ‘strict scrutiny’ jurisprudence. 
C Australia 
In Australia the caution with which special measures are viewed is similarly apparent 
in judicial opinion. In Gerhardy, the Australian High Court was prepared to accept 
legislation that limited access to a large tract of land on the basis of membership of a 
racial group, but only after intense scrutiny and subject to an express requirement that 
the policy encapsulated in the discriminatory legislation was ‘appropriate and 
adapted’ to ending the systemic original unequal enjoyment or exercise of human 
rights. In reaching this conclusion Justice Brennan identified four indicia of a 
legitimate special measure in the following passage: 
A special measure (1) confers a benefit on some or all members of a class, (2) the 
membership of which is based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, 
(3) for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of the beneficiaries in 
order that they may enjoy and exercise equally with others human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, (4) in circumstances where the protection given to the 
                                                
42 European Commission, Buying Social: A Guide to Taking into Account Social 
Considerations in Public Procurement (2010) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=978>. 
43 Beentjes (C-31/87) [1988] ECR 04635. 
44 European Commission v Kingdom of Netherlands (C-368) [2012] ECR. 
45 Procurement Directive art 26 allowing for ‘special conditions relating to the performance 
of a contract’ provides some limited scope for this. 
46 M Muller-Wrede, ‘Sustainable Purchasing in the Aftermath of the ECJ’s “Max Havelaar” 
Judgment’ (2012 7(2) European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 
110, 115. 
47 Ibid 117. 
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beneficiaries by the special measure is necessary in order that they may enjoy and 
exercise equally with others human rights and fundamental freedoms.48 
In a lengthy analysis of these indicia, his Honour made a number of points relevant 
to the current discussion, the first being ‘the beneficiaries of the special measure are 
natural persons not corporations’.49 His Honour noted in this context that a benefit 
conferred on an (Aboriginal) corporation may lead to benefits to natural persons, and 
that the purpose of a special measure may be gleaned from the terms of the legislation 
(if relevant) and other circumstances, and that the question of whether a measure leads 
to ‘advancement’ of a group can only be made by reference to the wishes of that 
group.50 Further, he noted that: 
To determine whether the measure in question is intended to remove and is 
necessary to remove inequality in fact (as distinct from formal inequality) the 
circumstances affecting the political, economic, social, cultural and other aspects of 
the lives of the disadvantaged group must be known and an opinion formed as to 
whether the measure is necessary and likely to be effective to improve those 
circumstances.51 
His Honour uncovered a certain tension here as the process outlined may involve 
questions that are essentially political and a ‘court is ill-equipped to answer a political 
question’.52 This noted, it is still incumbent on a court to consider whether ‘the 
political assessment inherent in the measure [could] reasonably be made?’.53 To do 
this it is ‘also necessary to find, as matters of fact, the circumstances affecting the 
racial group and the effect which the special measure is likely to have on those 
circumstances’.54 
Justice Deane echoed these sentiments, noting that the Court did not have before it 
sufficient evidence to form a view on the factual circumstances leading to the 
implementation of the measure55 but that ‘a finding that a provision was “taken” for 
a “sole purpose” … will not be precluded unless it appears that the provision is not 
capable of being reasonably considered appropriate and adapted to achieving that 
purpose’.56 His Honour noted a certain limitation though in commenting: ‘the Court 
                                                
48 Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR 70, 133 (Brennan J). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid 135. 
51 Ibid 137. 
52 Ibid 138. 
53 Ibid 139. 
54 Ibid. To similar effect see also 88 (Gibbs CJ); 104–5 (Mason J); 108 (Murphy J). His 
Honour suggested that evidence to displace a presumption that the necessary factual 
circumstance to support the legislation would be necessary to impugn its validity. 
55 Ibid 152 (Deane J). 
56 Ibid 153. His Honour made a similar point at 149. The ‘appropriate and adapted’ 
construction is also used by Mason J at 105. 
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is not concerned to determine whether the provisions are the appropriate ones to 
achieve, or whether they will in fact achieve, the particular purpose’.57 
More recently in Maloney v The Queen58 the High Court affirmed Gerhardy including 
the requirement that there needed to be a factual basis to support the legitimacy of a 
special measure and a requirement that the special measure be ‘reasonably necessary’ 
in order to redress discrimination.59 In reaching this view most of the various 
judgments expressly endorse the approach of Brennan and Deane JJ in Gerhardy as 
outlined above.60 The concept of reasonable necessity developed in the context of the 
Australian Constitution’s prohibition against discrimination against interstate trade.61  
While generally following the analytic structure posited by Brennan J in Gerhardy, 
Hayne J concluded that in determining whether a special measure is ‘adequate’ it is 
appropriate for a court to consider whether the same ‘advancement’ of a group denied 
full enjoyment of human rights could be achieved by a method less intrusive on the 
rights of other members of the community.62 
Crennan J referred to the US jurisprudence discussed above,63 but in the context of 
suggesting that Australian courts would not subject a special measure to strict 
scrutiny. Her Honour opined that there was no material before the Court to suggest 
that alternative measures were more appropriate.64 
Similarly (in obiter) Kiefel J opined that while the Court would consider whether 
there are reasonably practical alternative measures to the impugned measure: 
[t]he existence of any possible alternative is not sufficient to show that the measure 
chosen was not reasonably necessary according to the test. An alternative measure 
needs to be equally effective, before a Court can conclude that the measure is a 
disproportionate response.65 
Somewhat by contrast, Bell J while adopting the application of ‘reasonable necessity’ 
considered that to be so classified a law must be ‘proportionate to the legitimate end 
it seeks to serve’ but that this does not require a court to consider ‘whether there are 
reasonably available alternatives to the problem which are less restrictive of the 
                                                
57 Ibid 149. 
58 (2013) 252 CLR 168 (‘Maloney’). 
59 Ibid 182–5 (French CJ), 219–21 (Crennan J), 209–12 Hayne J), 231–7 (Keifel J), 258–60 
(Bell J), 301–4 (Gaegler J). 
60 Ibid 184 (French CJ), 219 (Crennan J), 259 (Bell J), 300 (Gaegler J). 
61 Constitution s 92. See Betfair P/L v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418. 
62 Maloney (2013) 252 CLR 168, 211 (Deane J). At 213 his Honour went on to form a view 
in relation to the effectiveness of other possible measures. 
63 Ibid 220 referring to University of California v Bakke 438 US 265, 290–1 (1978). 
64 Maloney (2013) 252 CLR 168, 222–3. 
65 Ibid 237 (Kiefel J). 
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protected interest’.66 However, the question of determining whether a law is 
proportionate will require the Court to inform itself of the factual circumstance 
surrounding the law.67 
Similarly Gaegler J equated the concepts of ‘reasonableness’, ‘proportionality’ and 
‘reasonable necessity’ in the determination of the validity of a special measure.68 His 
Honour also considered the issue of the facts upon which a court can form a view of 
reasonable necessity. He noted these can come from a range of sources suggesting 
they may or may not be ‘official’, should desirably be ‘public and authoritative’ and 
may include inferences from statute and even ‘statements from the bar’. His Honour 
opined that the facts must amount in practical terms to a ‘persuasive burden’ but not 
a ‘legal burden of proof’.69 
One final point of significance in regard to Maloney goes to the relevance of the 
evolving interpretation of the Convention at international law. The CERD considers 
the Convention to be a ‘living instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking 
into account the circumstances of contemporary society’.70 However the Australian 
High Court when interpreting Article 1.4 as part of the RDA adopted a different 
interpretive approach. The Court saw the development of international law 
subsequent to the enactment of the RDA as not relevant to the interpretation of the 
domestic statute.71 On this basis, the Court rejected the argument put by the appellant, 
Ms Maloney, that an essential element of the legitimacy of a special measure was that 
the group for whose benefit the measure was put in place had been consulted in 
relation to the measure and consented to it. 
From these two cases spanning nearly 30 years it seems fair to summarise then that 
the Australian High Court will not subject a purported special measure to the same 
level of scrutiny as that undertaken by the US Supreme Court. The Australian Court 
does make it clear though that the necessary factual circumstance to support the 
implementation of a special measure must exist both in the view of the legislature and 
to the court. Further should there be clear evidence (as to either existence of the need 
or appropriateness of the measure) before a court that there were not these factual 
bases the measure could be impugned.  
1 CERD 
The Australian Court’s express rejection of considering the development of 
international law in construing the Convention as it applies in domestic law highlights 
                                                
66 Ibid 259 (Bell J). 
67 Ibid 260. 
68 Ibid 296 (Gaegler J). The point was reiterated at 301. 
69 Ibid 299. 
70 CERD, above n 6 [5]. 
71 See Maloney (2013) 252 CLR 168, 181 (French CJ), 198 (Hayne J), 221–2 (Crennan J), 
235 (Keifel J); 255–6 (Bell J). The matter is discussed in greater length in S Rice, ‘Joan 
Monica Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28’ (2013) 8(7) Indigenous Law Bulletin 28. 
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the need to separately consider the attitude of the CERD towards determining the 
legitimacy of special measures. These views are found in General Recommendation 
3272 specifically at paragraphs 16 and 17 as follows: 
16. Special measures should be appropriate to the situation to be remedied, be 
legitimate, necessary in a democratic society, respect the principles of fairness and 
proportionality, and be temporary. The measures should be designed and 
implemented on the basis of need, grounded in a realistic appraisal of the current 
situation of the individuals and communities concerned.  
17. Appraisals of the need for special measures should be carried out on the basis 
of accurate data, disaggregated by race, colour, descent and ethnic or national origin 
and incorporating a gender perspective, on the socio-economic and cultural 
[Footnote: Article 2.2 includes the term ‘cultural’ as well as ‘social’ and 
‘economic’.] status and conditions of the various groups in the population and their 
participation in the social and economic development of the country. 
Paragraph 18 continues with noting the requirement for consultation with and the 
active participation of affected communities — the point that was rejected by the 
Australian High Court. 
A first point to note is that the CERD is discussing the design and development of 
special measures that would be undertaken by the legislative and/or executive arms 
of government, not the factual basis that is to be considered by the judiciary in 
considering a challenge to the legitimacy of a special measure. With that point noted, 
clearly the CERD considers there to be a need for accurate and comprehensive data 
both in relation to the need for the measure and its ‘design and implementation’. 
The CERD highlights this point and also addresses the need for the evaluation and 
monitoring of the effectiveness of special measures in paragraph 37 of the General 
Recommendation going to the contents of States parties’ reports to the CERD in 
identifying that such reports should address (inter alia): 
• the justifications for special measures, including relevant statistical and other 
data on the general situation of beneficiaries, a brief account of how the 
disparities to be remedied have arisen, and the results to be expected from the 
application of measures; 
• the available mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of the measures; 
• participation by targeted groups and individuals in the implementing 
institutions and in monitoring and evaluation processes;  
• the results, provisional or otherwise, of the application of the measures 
                                                
72 CERD, above n 6. 
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In deference to Article 2.2 the CERD also notes States parties’ reports should also 
include: 
• information on reasons why, in light of situations that appear to justify the 
adoption of measures, such measures have not been taken 
It would appear then that in respect of the level of evidential detail required in support 
of the need for, design of and effectiveness of special measures, the CERD’s approach 
is more akin to the strict scrutiny of the US judiciary than the discourse surrounding 
‘reasonable necessity’ of the Australian High Court.  
As Australia is bound to report to the CERD every two years73 the Commonwealth 
Government is under an obligation to demonstrate that the IBE is both ‘appropriate 
and adapted’ (or reasonably necessary) at the time of its establishment for domestic 
purposes. Further, for the purposes of its bi-annual report to the CERD, it must 
demonstrate a process of effective monitoring and evaluation of the IBE and the 
results it has achieved. 
The following two parts of this discussion examine both of these issues. Part 3 
considers whether the IBE can be considered appropriate and adapted to the task of 
ensuring Indigenous Australians’ ‘equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’. Part 4 examines issues relating to the monitoring and 
evaluation of procurement policies such as the IBE designed to achieve ‘secondary 
objectives’ in addition to the primary objective of obtaining goods and services on 
behalf of government. 
III APPROPRIATE AND ADAPTED 
For present purposes, a passage from Justice Brennan’s judgment in Gerhardy 
provides a succinct summary of the evidential task: 
To determine whether the measure in question is intended to remove and is 
necessary to remove inequality in fact (as distinct from formal inequality) the 
circumstances affecting the political, economic, social, cultural and other aspects of 
the lives of the disadvantaged group must be known and an opinion formed as to 
whether the measure is necessary and likely to be effective to improve those 
circumstances.74 
The first requirement, to establish that Indigenous Australians suffer disadvantage so 
as to not have ‘equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ is so notorious that further evidence is barely necessary. Recent statements 
from two authorities illustrate this point. 
                                                
73 Convention art 9(1)(b). 
74 Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR 70, 137 (Brennan J). 
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The report Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage: Key Indicators 2014, produced by 
the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision75 is a recent 
and comprehensive evidence source. The report provides evidence in regards to key 
disadvantage indicators such as: 
• Life expectancy 
• Young child mortality 
• Early childhood education 
• Literacy and numeracy 
• Year 12 attainment 
• Post-secondary education participation and attainment 
• Employment 
• Household and individual income 
The report shows that Indigenous Australians are at a considerable, at times 
devastating, disadvantage when compared to the broader Australian community. 
More recently this conclusion has been reiterated by the Australian Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet in the 2015 Closing the Gap Report.76 
What may not be so commonly appreciated is that the aspects of this multiple 
disadvantage are statistically correlated. That is, for example, an Indigenous 
Australian who is not in the labour force is also more likely to have lower educational 
standards, poorer health status and less adequate accommodation than an Indigenous 
Australian who is in the labour force.77 
Given this correlation, one would expect that an increase in the level of economic 
activity undertaken by Indigenous-owned enterprises should lead to an increase in the 
number of Indigenous Australians in the labour force and consequentially a reduction 
in the social disadvantage suffered by Indigenous Australians. This expectation is 
supported by empirical research.78 For example, Hunter concluded that Indigenous-
                                                
75 Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, Overcoming 
Indigenous Disadvantage: Key Indicators 2014 (Productivity Commission, 2014) 
(‘SCRGSP Report’) <http://www.pc.gov.au/research /recurring/overcoming-indigenous-
disadvantage/key-indicators-2014#thereport>. 
76 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Closing the Gap Report (2015) 
<http://www.dpmc.gov.au 
/sites/default/files/publications/Closing_the_Gap_2015_Report_0.pdf>.  
77 SCRGSP Report, above n 75, 3112–23. 
78 J Altman, ‘Indigenous Communities and Business: Three Perspectives, 1998–2000’ 
(CAEPR Working Paper No 9/2001,  Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 
Australian National University, 2001) <http://caepr.anu.edu.au 
/Publications/WP/2000WP9.php>; C Furneaux and K Brown, ‘Australian Indigenous 
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owned or jointly owned businesses report on average a 64 per cent Indigenous 
workforce. The equivalent figure for non-Indigenous business is 0.7 per cent.79 
The increased participation in the labour force should in turn lead to a reduction in 
the social disadvantage suffered by Indigenous Australians. This expectation is also 
supported by empirical research.80  
These findings allow us to conclude that as an increase in Commonwealth 
government purchasing of goods and services from Indigenous-owned enterprises 
leads to an increase in the level of economic activity undertaken by these firms, then 
this should lead to an increase in the number of Indigenous Australians in the labour 
force and therefore a reduction in Indigenous social disadvantage. There is also 
private sector evidence to suggest that procurement schemes targeting Indigenous 
enterprises lead to an increase in economic activity by these firms. For example a 
recent Commonwealth Government report noted that one corporation, Fortescue 
Metals Group Ltd, has awarded 156 contracts since 2011 with a total value of $1.56 
billion to over 50 Indigenous businesses.81 
The link between the increased activity of Indigenous enterprise, indigenous 
participation in the labour force and the reduction in Indigenous social disadvantage 
is important as it addresses a possible concern identified by Brennan J in Gerhardy 
and noted earlier, that ‘the beneficiaries of the special measure are natural persons 
not corporations’.82 Thus, in the context of the IBE the important link is that the 
advantage enjoyed by Indigenous enterprise leads to a reduction in social 
disadvantage suffered by natural persons. 
                                                
Entrepreneurship: A Capital-Based View’ (2008) 9(2) International Journal of 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation 133 <http://eprints.qut.edu.au/14234/1/14234a.pdf>. 
79 B Hunter, ‘Recent Indigenous Employment and Businesses: Whose Business Is It to 
Employ Indigenous Workers?’ (CAEPR Working Paper No 95/2014, Centre for Aboriginal 
Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, 2014) 10: 
<http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications 
/WP/CAEPR_Working_Paper_95.pdf>. The figure for majority owned Indigenous 
businesses was 72.4%. 
80 N Biddle,  ‘Income, Work and Indigenous Livelihoods’ (Lecture 5, Measures of 
Indigenous Wellbeing and their Determinants Across the Life-course, 2011 CAEPR Lecture 
Series,	Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, 
2011)	<http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/page/2011/01/ Lecture05Paper.pdf>. 
81 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, The Forrest Review – Creating Parity 
(2014) 183 <https://indigenous 
jobsandtrainingreview.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/The_Forrest_Review.pdf>. This 
also raises a question as to whether private sector procurement programs require 
characterisation as a special measure and the associated evidential analysis suggested 
therein; however, that matter is beyond the scope of the current discussion. 
82 Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR 70, 133 (Brennan J). His Honour noted that benefits can be 
enjoyed collectively (in the context of Gerhardy through ownership by a statutory body 
corporate of land). 
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The foregoing then supports the proposition that the IBE is ‘appropriate and adapted’ 
to the task of ensuring Indigenous Australians’ ‘equal enjoyment or exercise of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’. It does not address the question of whether 
the IBE has or will achieve its goal. This task is considered in the following section. 
IV MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS 
As noted in the introduction to this discussion, the scope of the IBE was significantly 
expanded in July 2015 when the new Commonwealth IPP introduced a requirement 
for Commonwealth agencies to ensure that a percentage of all procurement contracts 
(0.5 per cent in 2015–16 increasing to 2.5 per cent by 2018–19) is awarded to 
Indigenous-owned firms and a compulsory ‘set-aside’ for contracts be awarded with 
respect to work in remote areas. However, the IBE itself has been in place since May 
2011. Since that time until June 2015 according to the Australian National Audit 
Office only four contracts were awarded under the IBE. The following table sets out 
some of the detail of those four contracts.83 
Entity Nature of Contract Date Value ($ million) 
Industry Event Management June 2013 0.1 
Defence Construction May 2014 0.7 
Defence Construction January 2015 1.5 
Dept Human Services Cleaning February 2015 8.3 
 
It can be seen from this table that the four contracts had a total value of $10.3 million. 
The last contract awarded, in February of 2015, comprised $8.3 million of this total 
value. By way of contrast, in 2013–14, the Commonwealth Government entered into 
66,047 procurement contracts with a total value of $48.9 billion.84 During that 
financial year, one contract was awarded using the IBE with a value of $0.7 million. 
In percentage terms, IBE contracts amounted to 0.00015 per cent of the number of 
contracts for 2013–14 and 0.0014 per cent of value for that year. 
Some matters require noting in relation to this data. First, it will be recalled that the 
IBE only applied to exempt the CPR Division 2 requirement for the public tender of 
the purchase of goods and services in excess of $80,000 and the commissioning of 
construction works in excess of $7.5 million. As such the two construction contracts 
listed in the table above are not strictly awarded as a result of the IBE as they are 
under the threshold required for the public tender of construction contracts. 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, since July 2015 with the introduction of the 
targets contained in the IPP there has been a significant number of additional 
contracts let under the IBE. For example in October 2015 a further contract for 
                                                
83 Australian National Audit Office, Procurement Initiatives to Support Outcomes for 
Indigenous Australians, Report (2015) 73 (‘ANAO Report’) 
<http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2015-
2016/01/ANAOreport_2015-2016_01a.pdf>. 
84 Ibid 31. 
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security services valued at $9.2 million for each of three years was let under the IBE 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade85 and since then several construction 
contracts have been let by the Department of Defence. In total these contracts would 
appear to be valued at approximately $50 million. However, it is at the time of writing 
difficult to obtain verified confirmation of these figures and even if accurate the 
proportion of Commonwealth procurement taken up by Indigenous firms is only 
marginally altered. 
This data would suggest that while the IBE may be appropriate and adapted to 
addressing Indigenous Australian disadvantage it has, to date, been of very limited 
effectiveness. This in turn highlights the need to undertake a program of monitoring 
and evaluating the effectiveness of the IBE as required under Article 9(1)(b) of the 
Convention. It also suggests that some consideration should be given to whether 
‘secondary objective’ procurement policies more generally are effective.  
A The Effectiveness of Secondary Objective 
Procurement Policies 
Give the early experience of the IBE it is reasonable to consider whether secondary 
objective procurement policies are an effective special measure at all. While there is 
a volume of literature that considers the legitimacy of special measure procurement 
programs for the advantage of Indigenous peoples86 there is little published research 
that considers the effectiveness of these programs. Material from the US (particularly 
in light of the ‘strict scrutiny’ requirement arising from Adarand) and relating to 
special measure procurement programs designed to assist minority and women-
owned business is the most fruitful. This indicates that while minority (including 
Native American-owned) businesses still receive disproportionately fewer 
government contracts, the disparity is less marked in areas where special measure 
procurement programs (in the nature of the IBE) are in place.87 Further, as at 2003 of 
six surveyed US federal government departments, four exceeded the overall 
government target of a 5 per cent procurement from socially disadvantaged 
businesses as did the federal government procurement overall.88 These general 
conclusions are supported by an analysis of a specific program (in Erie County, New 
York) which indicated that, while the program was effective in developing women- 
and minority-owned businesses that participated in the procurement program, there 
was a limited take up of the program.89 
Aside from this generally quite high level data, however, there is little empirical 
analysis of the effectiveness of a particular special measures procurement programs 
                                                
85 DFAT, Media Release (13 October 2015). 
86 An excellent overview is provided in C McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, 
Government Procurement & Legal Change (OUP, 2007) 8–9. 
87 Enchautegui et al, above n 36. 
88  US Commission on Civil Rights, above n 28, 149. 
89 SL Wallace, ‘Minority Procurement: Beyond Affirmative Action to Economic 
Empowerment’ (1999) 27(1) Review of Black Political Economy 73. 
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designed to benefit Indigenous businesses. This shortcoming in the analysis of 
secondary objective procurement programs has been noted also in the context of 
programs intended to benefit small and medium enterprises (SME) generally (that is, 
not specifically Indigenous SMEs). Often the high level data can obscure the success 
or otherwise of particular programs.90 
With this in mind it is useful to consider analysis of the effectiveness of some 
particular secondary objective procurement programs. Due to the absence of data in 
respect of Indigenous targeted programs, analysis of SME targeted programs act as a 
useful proxy, noting also that under the IBE it is only SME Indigenous firms that are 
eligible to participate. 
Athey, Coeyy and Levin91 examine small business set-asides in US Forest Service 
contracts and conclude that the set-aside mechanism does achieve higher small 
business participation but also imposes higher costs. The authors suggest that a 
subsidy mechanism would produce more favourable (in terms of price and efficiency) 
results. Nakabayashi92  examined the effect of small business set-asides in Japanese 
public construction contracts. The author concluded that if the set-asides were 
removed there would be a significant exit of SMEs from the construction procurement 
market and that the resultant reduction in competition would operate to increase 
procurement costs. A similar conclusion was reached by Reis and Cabral.93 These 
authors considered the effect of the introduction of Brazilian federal law that allowed 
SME set-asides for contracts of a value of less than US$35,000 and a 5 per cent bid 
preference in other tenders. They concluded that the introduction of the law did not 
affect prices and did facilitate a significant increase in SME procurement 
participation. However, there was also an increase in post-contract termination for 
poor performance. Unless remedial measures were put in place this would inevitably 
increase the overall cost of procurement. Examining preferential bank financing 
programs for SMEs, Freeman is dubious in relation to their effectiveness.94  In a study 
involving 800 firms employing from less than 10 to greater than 250 employees in 
the UK, Georghiou et al found that while procurement policies were targeted at the 
                                                
90 See eg C Nicholas and M Fruhmann, ‘Small and Medium Enterprises Policies in Public 
Procurement: Time for a Rethink?’ (2014) 14(3) Journal of Public Procurement 328; A 
Freeman, ‘Challenging Myths about the Funding of Small Businesses … Finance and 
Growth’, Demos Finance (2013) <http://www.demos.co.uk /files/DF_-
_Finance_for_Growth_-_web.pdf?1378216438>.  
91 S Athey, D Coey and J Levin, ‘Set Asides and Subsidies in Auctions’ (2013) 5(1) 
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1. 
92 J Nakabayashi, ‘Small Business Set-Asides in Procurement Auctions: An Empirical 
Analysis’ (2013) 100 Journal of Public Economics 28. 
93 P R C Reis, and S Cabal, ‘Public Procurement Strategy: The Impacts of a Preference 
Program for Small and Micro Businesses’ (2015) 35(2) Public Money and Management 103. 
94 Freeman, above n 90, 57. 
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barriers faced by firms they were ineffective in removing them.95 Similarly, Nicholas 
and Fruhmann raise questions about the effectiveness of SME targeted procurement 
programs intended to foster innovation.96 
The mixed assessment revealed by even this small survey highlights a number of 
issues in relation to the effectiveness of special measures procurement programs. 
First, the high level data from the US suggests that overall such programs do tend to 
foster targeted businesses although do not of themselves eliminate disparate access 
to government procurement opportunities. Second, assessment of the results for 
procurement programs of differing designs (not surprisingly) differ. Third, even a 
largely ineffective program would still require justification as a special measure to 
avoid being characterised as unlawful discrimination — Adarand involved a 
challenge to the award of a single contract, not a challenge to the overall effectiveness 
of the program the contract award decision was made under. Fourth, if there was a 
substantial evidence base to suggest that a particular program was not effective then 
a legitimate question may be raised as to whether that program was ‘appropriate and 
adapted’ to redressing unequal enjoyment of human rights. Fifth, recalling the 
provisions of Articles 2.2 and 9.1(b) of the Convention, a government aware of the 
ineffectiveness of a special measure procurement program could be construed as 
obliged not only to report this matter to the CERD but to take remedial action to 
improve the effectiveness of that program. 
All of the above factors point to the importance of putting in place arrangements for 
monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of the IBE and, if need be, adjusting 
the design of the program in light of the results of that monitoring to improve its 
effectiveness. It is appropriate then to consider approaches to such monitoring and 
evaluation. 
B Methods of Monitoring Secondary Objective 
Procurement Policies 
In the context of procurement, ‘monitoring’ can refer to the process of contract 
management by the procuring agency. For the purposes of this discussion the 
monitoring and evaluation under examination is that of the effectiveness of the IBE. 
Under particular consideration is the collection of data regarding the award of 
contracts under the IBE and consequently the identification of methods to increase 
the rate of award of contracts. In the context of the IBE as a special measure, the 
collection of data confirming the connection between the award of contracts to 
Indigenous enterprise and reduction in Indigenous disadvantage and if need be 
adjustments in the program to enhance this connection would also be a necessary part 
of monitoring and evaluation. 
                                                
95 L Georghiou, J Edler, E Uyarra, J Yeow, ‘Policy Instruments for Public Procurement of 
Innovation: Choice, Design and Assessment’ (2014) 86 Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change 1. 
96 Nicholas and Fruhmann, above n 90, 350. 
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The development and implementation of monitoring and evaluation methods is of 
course essentially a discipline in its own right97 and it is beyond the scope of this 
discussion to do justice to this body of knowledge. However it is appropriate to 
identify some key components of an effective monitoring and evaluation approach to 
secondary objective public procurement programs. It is useful to provide some 
definitions at the outset. 
The OECD defines the term ‘monitoring’ as follows: 
Monitoring is a continuous function that uses the systematic collection of data on 
specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an 
ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and 
achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds.98 
In the same document ‘evaluation’ is also defined: 
Evaluation is the systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed 
project, program, or policy, including its design, implementation, and results. The 
aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development 
efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. An evaluation should provide 
information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned 
into the decision making process of both recipients and donors.99  
The discrete nature of the functions of monitoring on the one hand and evaluation on 
the other is clear in David Storey’s suggested six-step approach to the monitoring and 
evaluation of general SME policies100 which can be summarised as follows:101 
Monitoring 
Step 1   Take up of program 
Step 2   Recipient opinions 
Step 3   Recipient views of impact of program 
 
Evaluation 
Step 4    Comparison of assisted firms with ‘typical’ firms 
Step 5   Comparison with matched firms 
Step 6   Selection bias taken into account 
 
                                                
97 See eg A Markiewicz, and I Patrick, Developing Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks 
(Sage, 2015). 
98 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Glossary of Key 
Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management (OECD/Development Assistance 
Committee, Paris, 2015) 27<http://www.oecd.org /dac/evaluation/dcdndep/39249691.pdf>. 
99 Ibid 21. 
100 That is to say including but not limited to procurement related policies. 
101 D J Storey, ‘Entrepreneurship and SME Policy’ (World Entrepreneurship Forum 2008) 
<http://www.world-entrepreneurship-forum.com/Publications/Articles>. 
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Storey goes on to note that while steps 1 to 3 are often undertaken it is rare that a 
comparison with a ‘control group’ as required in steps 4 to 6 is completed. The 
methodology outlined by Storey and the view that most program review activities are 
limited to the monitoring and not the evaluation of funding is also a feature of the 
more recent analysis of SME policies in Latin America and the Caribbean undertaken 
by Acevedo and Tan in 2010 for the World Bank.102  
To date, with the limited exception of the ANAO Report103 which reported against 
Step 1 and to a limited extent Step 2 of the methodology suggested above there has 
been no thorough going work that has undertaken a monitoring exercise of the IBE 
let alone the control group based evaluation suggested by authors such as Storey, 
Acevedo and Tan. As noted earlier, given the Commonwealth Government’s 
obligations under Articles 2.2 and 9.1(b) of the Convention it would appear prudent 
to implement such a process of monitoring and evaluation. 
V CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this discussion has been threefold. At a foundational level it aimed to 
both outline the content of the IBE and its role within the broader IPP. Building on 
this foundation the discussion then sought to examine the nature and requirements of 
a special measure under the Convention and in particular whether the IBE could be 
legitimately portrayed as a special measure. This examination included reference to 
domestic jurisprudence in several jurisdictions and the views of the CERD as 
contained in its General Recommendations of the CERD. The examination concluded 
that for the IBE to satisfy the requirements of a special measure under the Convention 
both under international law and (to a more limited extent) domestic law it was 
necessary to be able to demonstrate that the policy was appropriate and adapted to 
redressing unequal enjoyment of human rights by Indigenous Australians and (at least 
to satisfy international legal requirements) to put in place mechanisms to evaluate and 
monitor the operation and effectiveness of the policy. 
The discussion then proceeded to examine the existing research around a number of 
these issues. As a result of this examination it was concluded that:  
• it was demonstrable that Indigenous Australians did not have equal 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms;  
• measures to foster Indigenous enterprise could reasonably be expected to 
improve this situation; and,  
• that there was evidence secondary objective procurement policies such as the 
IBE could be effective in so fostering Indigenous enterprise.  
 
                                                
102 G L Acevedo and H W Tan, Impact Evaluation of SME Policies in LAC (World Bank 
Group, 2010) 13–15 <http://www10. iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2010/05674.pdf>. 
103 ANAO Report, above n 83. 
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Accordingly the IBE can be legitimately characterised as a special measure under the 
Convention (and domestic law). However, in light of the ongoing obligations under 
Articles 2.2 and 9(1)(b) of the Convention it is incumbent on the Commonwealth 
Government to put in place effective processes for the monitoring and evaluation of 
the IBE. A possible methodological framework for such processes has been described 
although no such processes have been been put in place in any consistent fashion. 
From the foregoing it can be concluded that the IBE as a component of the broader 
IPP is a significant policy initiative that has the potential to have near revolutionary 
impact on the disadvantage to which many Indigenous Australians are currently 
subjected. To achieve this potential it is important that effective processes for the 
monitoring and evaluation of the IBE are put in place and that the IBE itself is refined 
over time to reflect the outcomes of these monitoring and evaluation processes.  
